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Interjurisdictional Immunity:  
The Pendulum Has Swung 
John G. Furey 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the division of powers analysis, interjurisdictional immunity has 
traditionally been treated as the second of three potential questions. The 
first is whether impugned legislation aims at a subject matter outside the 
jurisdiction of the legislative body enacting it. This question is answered 
through the use of the pith and substance doctrine. 
The second question is whether the law, having been found to be 
constitutionally valid, is inapplicable to particular persons, places or 
things by virtue of those subjects being within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the other level of government. This is the issue that is commonly 
referred to as interjurisdictional immunity. Practically speaking, this 
question has been restricted to asking whether a provincial law is 
applicable to federal persons or things. 
The third question asks whether a provincial law, found to be both 
valid and applicable, is inconsistent with valid federal law and therefore 
inoperative under the doctrine of paramountcy. 
Professor Hogg characterizes these three questions, or forms of 
attack on the legislation, as questions of legislative validity, applicability 
and operability.1 
In May 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered two decisions 
dealing with the second and third questions. In Canadian Western Bank 
v. Alberta,2 the Court considered whether provisions of the insurance 
regulatory regime of Alberta which governed the promotion of 
insurance, were applicable to federally chartered banks engaging in the 
promotion of certain types of insurance authorized under the Bank Act. 
The Court also considered whether the legislation was inoperative as 
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being inconsistent with the Bank Act. In British Columbia (Attorney 
General) v. Lafarge,3 the Court considered the applicability of a 
municipal zoning and development by-law to the construction of a 
concrete batching facility on waterfront lands owned by the Vancouver 
Port Authority (a federal undertaking under the Canada Marine Act)4 
and leased to Lafarge Canada. In that case, the Court also considered 
whether the provisions of the municipal by-law, as delegated provincial 
legislation, were inconsistent with the provisions of the Canada Marine 
Act. 
In Canadian Western Bank, by a 6-1 majority, the Court upheld the 
Alberta regulatory regime as being applicable to banks, thereby rejecting 
the interjurisdictional immunity argument raised by the banks, and held 
that there was no inconsistency between the provincial and federal 
legislation, such that the paramountcy doctrine did not render the 
provincial legislation inoperative. In Lafarge, again by a 6-1 majority, 
the Court rejected the interjurisdictional immunity argument, but 
unanimously found operational conflict between the municipal by-law in 
question, and the federal regulatory regime surrounding port lands and 
lands owned by the Port Authority. Accordingly, the Court held the 
municipal by-law to be inoperative. On the issue of interjurisdictional 
immunity, Bastarache J. dissented in both cases (concurring in the result 
in Lafarge). 
This paper focuses solely on the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, as these two cases have significantly altered the application of 
that doctrine in favour of allowing valid provincial legislation to apply to 
federal undertakings, persons, places or things. I will argue that these 
cases have brought much needed clarity to the methodology of 
application of the doctrine, though there remains some uncertainty as to 
how far the Court has gone in limiting its use. 
For a full understanding of the importance of these decisions, it is 
necessary to briefly consider the history of the doctrine, and the 
significant criticisms levelled at its application. 
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II. THE HISTORY OF INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY 
1.  The Companies Cases 
The earliest emergence of the concept that valid provincial legislation 
could not apply to a federal “thing” arose at the turn of the 19th century, 
but the articulation of a requirement of impairment fell to the companies 
cases (John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton and Great West Saddlery Co. v. 
The King).5 These cases decided that provincial companies legislation 
which prohibited “extra-provincial companies” from carrying on 
business in the province without a licence could apply to companies 
incorporated under the jurisdiction of other provinces or countries, but 
could not apply to a federally incorporated company. The rationale 
behind the decisions was that the effect of the prohibition would be to 
deprive the federal company of its corporate status or essential power. 
Since these were powers within the exclusive authority of the federal 
level of government by virtue of its “incorporation power” (recognized 
under peace, order and good government), no provincial legislation 
could apply to deprive such a company of status. 
However, even these early cases distinguished between provincial 
legislation which could deprive a federal company of its corporate status 
or existence in a province, and provincial legislation which merely 
regulated business activity. The latter was held to be applicable to 
federal companies. 
This has been confirmed more recently in Canadian Indemnity 
Company v. British Columbia (Attorney General),6 in which the Supreme 
Court found that the creation of a Crown monopoly over automobile 
insurance in the province of British Columbia did not impair the 
corporate status of federally incorporated insurance companies, but was 
merely an example of regulation of a particular business or industry, and 
therefore applicable to the federal companies. 
2. The Undertakings Cases 
The standard of impairment was later expanded and applied to 
federal undertakings; in these early cases provincial law was found to be 
inapplicable to federal undertakings only if it “impaired” those 
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undertakings in the sense of “paralyzing” or “sterilizing” the undertakings 
(Ontario (Attorney General) v. Winner).7 
In Quebec (Commission de salaire minimum) v. Bell Telephone Co.,8 
the Supreme Court considered whether the Minimum Wage Act of 
Quebec9 could apply to employees of Bell Telephone, a federal 
undertaking. The Court considered wage rates, like hours of work and 
other working conditions, to be a “vital part” of the management and 
operation of a federal undertaking, and held the legislation inapplicable, 
because “all matters which are a vital part of the operation of an 
interprovincial undertaking as a going concern are matters which are 
subject to the exclusive legislative control of the federal Parliament”.10 
By virtue of Bell Canada 1966, provincial law was now inapplicable to 
“vital parts” of federal undertakings, without any requirement of 
“impairing”, “paralyzing” or “sterilizing” the undertaking. 
This application of the doctrine was the subject of academic 
criticism, primarily by Professors Gibson and Hogg.11 These criticisms 
were addressed and rejected by the Supreme Court in Bell Canada v. 
Québec (Commission de santé et de la sécurité du travail).12 
Bell Canada 1988 became the leading contemporary case on the 
scope of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. The Court reasoned 
that Parliament was vested with exclusive legislative jurisdiction (on the 
facts of that case) over labour relations and working conditions “when 
that jurisdiction is an integral part of its primary and exclusive 
jurisdiction over another class of subjects”,13 which in that case was the 
federal undertaking of telecommunications. 
The Court went on to state that this rule: 
… appear[ed] to constitute only one facet of a more general rule: 
works, such as federal railways, things, such as land reserved for the 
Indians, and persons, such as Indians, who were within the special and 
exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament, are still subject to provincial 
statutes that are general in their application, whether municipal 
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legislation, legislation on adoption, hunting or the distribution of 
family property, provided however that the application of these 
provincial laws does not bear upon those subjects in what makes them 
specifically a federal jurisdiction …14 
After addressing and rejecting the academic criticisms of Professors 
Gibson and Hogg, the Court reaffirmed the “vital aspect test”, stating 
that the principle of interjurisdictional immunity would be “given effect” 
if “the provincial statute which purports to apply to the federal 
undertaking affects a vital or essential part of that undertaking, without 
necessarily going so far as impairing or paralyzing it”.15 
In this theory of interjurisdictional immunity, the existence of an 
“integral” part of the primary and exclusive federal jurisdiction is based 
on the assertion that, due to this exclusivity, there exists a “basic, 
minimum and unassailable content”16 to each federal head of power into 
which otherwise valid provincial legislation may not intrude. 
I would argue that at this stage in the development of the 
interjurisdictional immunity jurisprudence, the Court had identified two 
related but different concepts. The first is the concept that valid provincial 
legislation may not deal with a subject matter which is integral to a 
particular head of federal legislative power. The second, related concept 
is that provincial legislation may not affect a vital or essential part of a 
federally regulated undertaking, person or thing. The first concept is the 
constitutional principle of interjurisdictional immunity, and the second is 
merely the test applied by the Court in particular circumstances to 
determine if that constitutional rule has been violated. 
For example, in Bell Canada 1988, the Court confirmed that a 
provincial statute will bear upon the specifically federal nature of a 
federal undertaking if it affects a vital or essential part of that 
undertaking. The very clear wording used by the Court indicated that the 
vital aspect test was not a question of whether provincial legislation 
merely “affects” the head of federal power (a formulation that would be 
quite broad, and threatening to the concepts of “incidental effects” and 
“double aspect” under the pith and substance analysis). Rather, the 
appropriate question is whether the provincial legislation affects a vital 
or essential aspect of the undertaking, person or thing which is subject to 
that federal legislative power. 
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Further support for this articulation of the doctrine and the vital 
aspect test is found in the Supreme Court decision in Irwin Toy17 when 
the Court stated: 
The federal government has exclusive jurisdiction as regards “essential 
and vital elements” of a federal undertaking, including the management 
of such an undertaking, because those matters form the “basic, 
minimum and unassailable content” of the head of power created by 
operation of ss. 91(29) and the exceptions in ss. 92(10) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867.18 
With respect to Irwin Toy, it is worth noting that, despite the  
Court’s rejection of the academic criticisms in Bell Canada 1988 just 
one year earlier, the Court began a “reassessment” of the doctrine  
of interjurisdictional immunity. This “reassessment” consisted of a 
qualification, such that the vital aspect test would apply only to provincial 
laws that purported to apply directly to federal undertakings. Where the 
provincial law was otherwise aimed, and had only an indirect effect on 
the undertaking, the law would be inapplicable only if it impaired, 
paralyzed or sterilized the undertaking. 
III. CRITICISMS OF INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY 
The criticisms of the doctrine have been varied. After the decision in 
Bell Canada 1988, the criticisms no longer called for a rejection of the 
doctrine itself, but rather for a rejection of the vital aspect test, and a 
return to the impairment standard. A useful summation of the criticisms 
is found in the reasons of Bastarache J. in Lafarge.19 
In the companion cases of Canadian Western Bank20 and Lafarge, 
four major criticisms were advanced at the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The first is that the doctrine, particularly after the adoption of the vital 
aspect test, had become confused and incapable of consistent 
application. Second, it was argued that the threshold for invoking the 
doctrine was too low (i.e., “affect a vital aspect” or “touching Indianness”) 
and that such a low threshold conflicted with principles of federalism 
recognized by the Court. Third, the application of the doctrine was one-
sided. While in theory both federal and provincial powers are reserved 
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“exclusively” to each level of government, the Court has generally 
concerned itself only with identifying the “basic, minimum and 
unassailable content” of federal heads of power. Finally, it was 
suggested that any form of interjurisdictional immunity, but particularly 
a doctrine with such a low threshold, was unnecessary in a federal 
system in which paramountcy rested with the federal level of government. 
1. A Confusing Doctrine 
Professor Hogg has characterized the vital aspect test as both too 
broad and too vague.21 I certainly agree that a determination of what 
“affects” a vital or essential part of a federal undertaking, person or thing 
is a far more difficult proposition than determining what “impairs”, 
“sterilizes” or “paralyzes”. However, my criticism of the confusion in 
application of the doctrine stems primarily from its overly broad 
application, in two ways. 
(a) When Should the Doctrine be Applied? 
The first is the question of when the doctrine is to be applied. As 
already pointed out, in theory there is a “basic, minimum and 
unassailable content” or “core” to every head of power, both federal and 
provincial. However, when addressing the “core” of the various federal 
heads of power, the Supreme Court has not applied the theory 
consistently to every federal power. A comparison of two decisions 
illustrates this point. 
In Ordon Estate v. Grail,22 the Court considered whether provincial 
legislation governing damages, negligence and apportionment of liability 
could fill in any gaps in Canadian maritime law and govern a fatality 
occurring as a result of a boating accident on inland waters of Ontario. 
After quoting the seminal passage of Beetz J. from Bell Canada 1988 
(which treated the “general rule” as being restricted to works, things and 
persons), the Court treated this as a principle “that each head of federal 
power possesses an essential core which the provinces are not permitted 
to regulate indirectly”.23 
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The Court went on to hold that maritime negligence law was part of 
the unassailable core of the federal power over navigation and shipping 
(i.e., federal maritime law) and for that reason, provincial legislation 
could not apply even for the purpose of filling in gaps in federal law. 
The extension of interjurisdictional immunity from undertakings, 
things and persons to a head of federal power which governs an activity 
(navigation and shipping) was perceived to be necessary on the facts of 
Ordon Estate, in order to preserve a uniform system of maritime 
negligence law across the country. This desire for uniformity, and the 
Court’s perception that the lack of uniformity would compromise 
Canada’s international treaty obligations relating to maritime matters, 
was of great concern to the Court.24 
This is to be contrasted with the approach taken by the Court in 
O.P.S.E.U. v. Ontario (Attorney General), in which it was argued that a 
provincial law limiting political activities of provincial civil servants 
during federal election campaigns intrudes upon a core of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over federal elections. After discussing the history of 
interjurisdictional immunity, Dickson C.J.C. stated that in his view, it 
was “not a particularly compelling doctrine”, accepted the criticisms as 
advanced by Professor Hogg and concluded by stating: 
I am not prepared to extend the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity 
into a field — federal elections — which is unrelated to either the 
company law cases or the federal undertakings cases, the two historical 
roots of the doctrine.25 
Both Ordon Estate and O.P.S.E.U. are cases in which the Court was 
asked to protect the core of a federal power governing an activity, as 
opposed to federal things or persons. It cannot be seriously argued that 
navigation and shipping is any more closely related to the companies and 
undertakings cases than is federal elections. Accordingly, it is 
exceedingly difficult to reconcile the two cases, other than to say that the 
Court felt a need for uniformity in maritime negligence law, and no 
similar considerations governed the fact circumstance in O.P.S.E.U. In 
any event, the treatment of these two cases highlights the confusion 
surrounding the question of when the doctrine would be applied, 
particularly outside the context of undertakings, persons or things. 
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(b) The Methodology of Application of the Doctrine 
A second source of confusion has existed in the methodology of 
application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. I have already 
proposed that the correct methodology is to view the constitutional 
doctrine as a prohibition on valid provincial legislation dealing with a 
subject matter which is integral to, or at the core of, a particular head of 
federal legislative power. Since Bell Canada 1988,26 determination of 
that question generally has fallen to the application of the vital aspect 
test: does the provincial law affect a vital or essential part of the federal 
undertaking, person or thing? If it does, it deals with a matter integral to 
the federal power. 
In such an analysis, the question of whether the provincial 
legislation affects a vital part of the federal undertaking, person or thing 
is necessarily a fact-based assessment. 
Examples of such a fact-based assessment exist throughout the 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Irwin Toy,27 the Court considered 
Quebec legislation which prohibited the use of commercial advertising 
directed at persons under 13 years of age. The focus of the Court’s 
factual inquiry was the effect of that provision on the operations of 
television broadcasters (as federal undertakings). In Natural Parents v. 
British Columbia (Superintendent of Child Welfare), the Court found 
that provincial adoption legislation could not apply of its own force to 
Indian children on the basis of the Court’s factual assessment of the 
potential that Indian parents could be compelled to surrender Indian 
children to adopting non-Indian parents, which would “constitute a 
serious intrusion in the Indian family relationship”.28 It was the effect of 
the legislation upon the rights of persons under federal jurisdiction 
which drove the reasons of the Court. 
Similarly, in Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board),29 the 
Court considered the objection of the airline to the payment of a mark-up 
charge by a provincial liquor corporation respecting liquor destined for 
consumption during flight. The Court acknowledged that, while in some 
circumstances the provision of food and water on aircraft would be 
essential (i.e., on longer flights), the provision of liquor was simply not 
essential to the operation of aircrafts. Once again, the Court conducted a 
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fact-specific analysis of the effect of the provincial legislation upon the 
federally regulated undertaking, in order to determine if the legislation 
impacted upon the basic, minimum and unassailable core of federal 
jurisdiction. 
However, this methodology of application has not been uniform. A 
comparison of the treatment in the lower courts of the companion cases 
of Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge illustrates the confusion 
surrounding the application of the doctrine. 
In Canadian Western Bank, the Alberta Court of Appeal essentially 
followed this proposed analysis, without expressly stating so. However, 
the Court explicitly recognized the necessary factual inquiry, when it 
stated: 
What is at the core of a federal power is obviously fact-sensitive, as is 
the determination of whether the impugned law affects a vital part of a 
matter within exclusive federal jurisdiction. Recent Supreme Court 
cases demonstrate this.30 
The Alberta Court of Appeal accepted the findings of fact of the trial 
judge, leading to the conclusion that the promotion of certain types of 
insurance was not at the core of banking. The relevant factual findings 
included the voluntary nature of the insurance in question, that it could 
be cancelled after a loan had been advanced, and the lack of connection 
between the insurance and loan repayment. These factors were cited as 
evidence that the promotion of insurance was simply a new source of 
profitability for banks, rather than a form of protection of loan portfolios. 
Thus, the Alberta courts concluded that, factually, promotion of 
insurance could not be at the “core” of banking. It followed that the 
impugned regulations did not affect anything at the “core”. 
In the companion case of Lafarge, however, the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal had applied the doctrine in a much broader fashion. 
Rather than asking whether the municipal by-law in question (which 
contained height restrictions that would have prohibited the concrete 
batch plant proposed by Lafarge) affected a vital or essential part of the 
federal undertaking in question (the Port Authority) the Court of Appeal 
instead articulated the test as a question of “whether the application of 
the city’s by-law to regulate the development of port lands would affect 
a vital aspect of the federal power over navigation and shipping”.31  
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Not surprisingly, the British Columbia Court of Appeal proceeded to 
find that the exercise of jurisdiction over land use and development on 
lands owned by the Port Authority was a vital part of the federal power, 
and that any provincial regulation in that area was therefore inapplicable. 
The Court did not factually address the impact of the municipal by-
law under attack on the operations of the Port Authority. In short, the 
Court did not address the question of whether the by-law affected a vital 
or essential part of the Port Authority’s operations. On the facts of the 
case, the lands upon which Lafarge Canada, as lessee, proposed to build 
the concrete batch plant were lands that were incidental to the use of the 
port, not lands used in port operations. The most that could be said on 
the facts of the case is that the operations of Lafarge Canada on these 
lands would be supportive of port operations, in the sense that they 
created a demand for port business, in the form of shipping of aggregate 
and other products. 
The framing of the question by the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal was, with respect, overly broad. As already stated, such a broad 
characterization of the test threatened the existence of the “double aspect” 
doctrine, and the concept that valid legislation can have “incident effects” 
on the other level of government. 
More to the point, however, it was significantly at odds with the 
methodology of application utilized by the Alberta Court of Appeal in 
Canadian Western Bank.32 
2. The Threshold and Principles of Federalism 
Following Bell Canada 1988, the threshold for application of the 
doctrine was crossed when provincial legislation “affected” a vital or 
essential part of a federal undertaking, person or thing. It is apparent that 
this is a considerably lower threshold than the previous formulation of 
the test, which required impairment, in the sense of “paralyzing” or 
“sterilizing” the undertaking. In Bell Canada 1988, Beetz J. contemplated 
that the doctrine would be applied to preclude application of provincial 
legislation to a federal undertaking if the legislation affected a vital or 
essential part of the undertaking, “without necessarily going as far as 
impairing or paralyzing”.33 
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This lower threshold, combined with the potential that the doctrine 
could be applied to protect a core of every federal head of power, could 
represent a significant threat to principles of federalism. What are these 
principles? They were enunciated by the Court in O.P.S.E.U., where 
Dickson C.J.C. recognized that “the history of Canadian constitutional 
law has been to allow for a fair amount of interplay and indeed overlap 
between the federal and provincial powers” and that the concept of 
interjurisdictional immunity has not been the “dominant tide” of Canadian 
constitutional law, those being the doctrines of pith and substance and 
“double aspect”.34 
More recently, the Court has summarized the relevant principles of 
federalism as follows: 
In a federal system, each level of government can expect to have its 
jurisdiction affected by the other to a certain degree. As Dickson C.J. 
stated in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, at p. 669, “overlap of legislation is to be expected 
and accommodated in a federal state”. Laws mainly in relation to the 
jurisdiction of one level of government may overflow into, or have 
“incidental effects” upon, the jurisdiction of the other level of government. 
It is a matter of balance and of federalism: no one level of government 
is isolated from the other, nor can it usurp the functions of the other.35 
The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, particularly when 
formulated as the vital aspect test, conflicts with these principles of 
federalism. Too low a threshold for invocation of the doctrine is 
threatening to the fundamental constitutional doctrine that laws of one 
level of government may incidentally affect the jurisdiction of the other 
level of government. 
It is worth noting that in Law Society of British Columbia v. 
Mangat,36 the Supreme Court considered whether agents appearing 
before the federal Immigration Refugee Board were required to comply 
with British Columbia’s Legal Profession Act.37 The Court rejected the 
argument that the provincial legislation could not apply because of 
interjurisdictional immunity, in fact rejecting the application of the 
doctrine to the particular facts of that case. The Court held that the 
existence of a “double aspect” to the subject matter at issue favoured 
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the application of the paramountcy doctrine, rather than that of 
interjurisdictional immunity. The Court was concerned with the potential 
that interjurisdictional immunity would exclude the application of the 
provincial legislation even in circumstances where Parliament chose not 
to legislate in the area. 
3. Unnecessary Where Paramountcy Rests with the Federal 
Parliament 
Mangat is the appropriate lead-in for the criticism that the doctrine is 
unnecessary to protect federal core jurisdiction in light of federal 
paramountcy. 
In my view, this is one of the more salient criticisms of the vital 
aspect test. The vast majority, if not all, of the challenges to provincial 
legislation on the basis of interjurisdictional immunity are not challenges 
in which the federal level of government seeks to limit the application of 
provincial legislation. Rather, these challenges are commenced by 
“federal” persons or organizations such as banks, telecommunications 
companies, inter-provincial railways, and port authorities who seek to 
avoid the impact of valid provincial legislation which governs the 
conduct of all other “non-federal” persons and organizations that would 
normally be subject to such legislation. If the federal level of government 
were truly concerned that provincial legislation was encroaching upon 
the core of federal jurisdiction in a particular area, the federal Parliament 
need only speak in clear and unambiguous terms to invoke the doctrine 
of paramountcy, either by creating an operational conflict between 
federal and provincial legislation, or alternatively, drafting legislation 
which has a purpose incompatible with the application of provincial 
legislation to the federally regulated persons, things or undertakings. 
This criticism still relates to reconciliation of the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity with the principles of federalism. Because 
interjurisdictional immunity is supplemented by the doctrine of federal 
paramountcy, it is far more consistent with the principles of federalism 
espoused in O.P.S.E.U.38 and the Firearms Reference39 if the threshold 
for application of the doctrine is a threshold of impairment, rather than a 
threshold of “affecting” a vital aspect. 
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The final point to this criticism is one that had already been made  
by the Supreme Court prior to its decisions in Canadian Western Bank40 
and Lafarge.41 This is the reality that application of the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity can oust provincial law even in circumstances 
when Parliament has not legislated in the area.42 This raises the risk of 
regulatory vacuums, and uneven regulation of federal and provincial 
organizations involved in essentially the same activity. The facts in 
Canadian Western Bank are a prime illustration of this potential problem. 
Banks, as federally regulated organizations, having been authorized by 
the Bank Act43 to enter into a provincially regulated field (insurance), 
could potentially avoid the application of provincial law governing all 
others who promote insurance in a particular province. 
4. One-sided Nature of the Doctrine 
As has already been pointed out, the theoretical underpinning for the 
doctrine is the exclusive nature of federal jurisdiction over the various 
heads of power set out in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867,44 and 
the fact that each such head of power has a “core” which must be 
protected from provincial regulation. However, the heads of power 
granted to the provinces under section 92 are no less exclusive than 
federal powers, subject of course to the doctrine of paramountcy in the 
double aspect cases. There is no recognition of this fact in the form of a 
basic, minimum and unassailable content attributed to provincial heads 
of power. 
This is perhaps so because of the existence of the doctrine of 
paramountcy. It could be argued that valid federal legislation could 
never be held inapplicable to a subject matter which is at the “core” of a 
provincial power, if the rules of our Constitution state that paramountcy 
is reserved to the federal Parliament in the event of conflict between 
valid provincial and valid federal legislation. 
However, this does not alter the fact that interjurisdictional 
immunity is a one-sided doctrine. An illustrative example is found in 
Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada.45 At first blush, this case 
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was a simple exercise in the statutory interpretation of section 10 of the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,46 which provides that civilian 
employees necessary for carrying out the duties of the RCMP are to be 
appointed under specific federal legislation. The provision was 
interpreted by the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal as requiring 
provincial and municipal employees supporting RCMP operations to be 
employed by the federal government as civilian employees of the 
RCMP. This of course arose in circumstances in which the RCMP was 
providing policing services under contract to provinces and municipalities. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court issued a one-paragraph decision in which 
it limited the application of section 10 of the RCMP Act to civilian staff 
appointed by the RCMP Commissioner, stating that it did not apply to 
civilian staff appointed or employed by a municipality where that 
municipality has a policing agreement with the RCMP. 
However, but for that interpretation, the case would have raised a 
significant constitutional issue. Could Parliament require that such 
employees be federal employees? Such a question would pit provincial 
jurisdiction over the “administration of justice in the Province” against 
the federal power to manage its own organizations, in this case the 
RCMP. It has long been recognized that the enforcement of criminal 
law, policing and the suppression of crime and disorder is part of 
provincial jurisdiction over the administration of justice, and is “wholly 
with the provinces”.47 
Thus, it is clearly within the authority of the provinces to contract 
for the provision of policing services from the RCMP, but at the same 
time employ matrons, guards, receptionists and janitors as provincial 
employees who provide support services necessary for the operation of a 
policing detachment. The Attorney General of New Brunswick intervened 
in this case, and applied to the Court to state two constitutional questions. 
The first constitutional question asked whether section 10 of the RCMP 
Act was constitutionally invalid in relation to the administration of justice 
under section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867. This constitutional 
question was stated by the Chief Justice for the Court. 
The second constitutional question proposed by the Attorney 
General of New Brunswick was whether section 10(1) of the RCMP Act 
was constitutionally applicable to provincial and municipal civilian 
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employees providing support services to the RCMP, where the RCMP is 
performing provincial policing duties under contract with a province or 
municipality. This constitutional question, which would have directly 
raised whether federal legislation could intrude on the core of provincial 
jurisdiction, was not stated for the Court. 
One can only conclude that the Court had no desire to embark on an 
inquiry of the question of “basic, minimum and unassailable content” of 
provincial heads of power. 
IV. THE DECISIONS 
In Canadian Western Bank, the Court acknowledged virtually all of 
the criticisms advanced, and made it clear that the Court did not favour 
“an intensive reliance on the doctrine”.48 Six reasons were advanced for 
this position, as follows:49 
1. Broad application of the doctrine to “activities” creates a problem of 
application which does not exist with respect to undertakings, things 
or persons. 
2. Broad application is inconsistent with principles of federalism, 
promoted by the constitutional doctrines of pith and substance, double 
aspect and paramountcy. 
3. Excessive reliance on the doctrine would create serious uncertainty. 
4. The risk of creating “legal vacuums”, recognized in Mangat, is 
generally speaking not desirable. 
5. Broad use of the doctrine creates an “unintentional centralizing 
tendency of constitutional interpretation”. This “asymmetrical” 
application of the doctrine is incompatible with contemporary Canadian 
federalism. 
6. The doctrine is superfluous due to the operation of the doctrine of 
federal paramountcy. 
Having accepted the criticisms advanced, the Court has taken three 
concrete steps that clearly reduce the circumstances in which the 
doctrine will be applied. I would also argue that the Court has given 
itself room to further restrict the applicability of the doctrine in future 
cases. I will first deal with the three limitations the majority has placed 
on the applicability of the doctrine. 
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1. Higher Threshold — A Return to Impairment 
The Court spent little time in raising the threshold for the application 
of the doctrine from “affecting” a vital or essential part of a federal 
undertaking, person or thing to “impairing” that vital or essential part. 
“Affecting”, in the opinion of the Court, is not enough to invoke the 
doctrine, because it does not imply any requirement of “adverse 
consequence”, whereas the concept of impairment does imply such a 
consequence to the federal person, thing or undertaking. 
Ultimately, the Court concluded: 
It is when the adverse impact of a law adopted by one level of 
government increases in severity from “affecting” to “impairing” 
(without necessarily “sterilizing” or “paralyzing”) that the “core” 
competence of the other level of government (where the vital essential 
part of an undertaking duly constitutes) is placed in jeopardy, and not 
before.50 
This statement raises two points. First, despite the earlier statement 
of the Court that the law as it stood prior to Bell Canada 198851 better 
reflected Canada’s federal scheme, this decision may not represent a 
return to the older impairment concept, which was connoted with 
“sterilizing” or “paralyzing” the federal undertaking. Rather, the Court 
seems to be saying that while impairment is required, in the sense that 
there must be an “adverse consequence” upon the federal undertaking as 
a result of the provincial law, it is not necessary to “sterilize” or 
“paralyze” in order to invoke the doctrine. 
In this sense, it may be that the view of the majority on the 
appropriate threshold for the application of the doctrine is not 
significantly at odds with the standard suggested by Bastarache J. in 
dissent in Lafarge. Justice Bastarache argues for a “kind of middle 
ground” between the overly vague and broad standards of “touches on” 
(a phrase which is usually associated with the Indian cases), and the 
overly restrictive standard of “sterilizes” or “impairs”. In the view of 
Bastarache J., paralysis of the core of the federal power or the operations 
of the undertakings is not required, but “the impact of the application of 
the by-law must be sufficiently serious to trigger immunity”.52 
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It is arguable that, with respect to the sole issue of the threshold of 
application, these two views are not as divergent as they may first 
appear. The view of the majority does contemplate a middle ground, 
because its view of “impairment” does not consist of a requirement for 
“paralyzing” or “sterilizing”. For Bastarache J., the concept of 
impairment does imply a requirement of “sterilizing”. For reasons that 
shall be seen however, I believe a significant difference does exist 
between the threshold established by the majority, and that relied upon 
by Bastarache J. in dissent. 
The second point concerns the methodology of application of the 
doctrine, where the majority and Bastarache J. clearly diverge. In his 
dissent in Lafarge, Bastarache J. follows the same approach as that of 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal when he characterizes the 
question as whether the municipal by-law would affect a vital part of the 
federal legislative authority over navigation and shipping. This flows 
from his characterization of interjurisdictional immunity as concerning 
jurisdiction, rather than action or activities. His analysis is far less 
concerned about the impact of provincial law on the federal undertaking, 
person or thing, than it is upon the federal head of power.53 
The majority, however, does equate the “core” competence of the 
federal level of government with the vital or essential part of federally 
regulated undertakings, persons or things. This approach is much more 
consistent with the methodology I had earlier referred to, and does 
engage in the fact-based determination of whether there is an impairment 
of a vital or essential part of the federal undertaking, in order to 
determine if the provincial law strikes at what is “integral” to the federal 
head of power. 
As will be seen however, the majority does reserve a slightly 
different treatment for the cases involving federal heads of power 
dealing with “activities”. 
This difference in methodology determines the result in the Lafarge 
case. The approach of Bastarache J., which is a considerably broader 
application of the doctrine, results in a finding that the municipal by-law 
is inapplicable. The approach of the majority led to a decision that 
interjurisdictional immunity did not apply. 
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2. “Vital and Essential” Means “Vital and Essential” 
Though not as dramatic as altering the threshold for application 
established in Bell Canada 1988, the reinforcement by the majority that 
the provincial legislation must impair a “vital and essential part” of an 
undertaking is nonetheless important. The majority treats “vital or 
essential” in its ordinary grammatical sense, focusing on the meaning of 
“absolutely indispensable or necessary”.54 This clarification, combined 
with the methodology of application of the majority and the raising of 
the threshold to one of “impairment”, effectively returns the application 
of interjurisdictional immunity to a standard of “sterilizing” or 
“paralyzing”. If a provincial law must impair that part of an undertaking 
which is “absolutely indispensable or necessary” to the undertaking 
before the law would be considered inapplicable, it is difficult to see 
how anything short of “paralyzing” the undertaking would suffice. 
The facts in Canadian Western Bank are not particularly helpful in 
demonstrating this point, as the Court made it very clear that the 
provincial insurance licensing requirements in question did not affect the 
“core” of banking, let alone impair it. However, the way in which the 
Court phrases its conclusions on the facts of the case supports a return to 
the requirement of “sterilizing” or “paralyzing”. The Court states: 
It is simply not credible, in our view, to suggest that the promotion of 
“peace of mind” insurance is “absolutely indispensable or necessary” 
to enable the banks to carry out their undertakings in what makes them 
specifically of federal jurisdiction.55 
If a particular activity is “absolutely indispensable or necessary” to 
enable a federal undertaking to carry out its undertaking, provincial law 
which prohibits that activity must surely paralyze the undertaking. 
3. Paramountcy Is the Preferred Doctrine 
In addition to the alterations in the threshold of application for the 
doctrine, the majority placed greater restriction on the federal heads of 
power to which the doctrine will be applied. The majority does this in 
the context of discussion of the appropriate order of application of the 
constitutional doctrines of pith and substance, interjurisdictional 
immunity and paramountcy. 
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It is unfortunate that the majority chose to address this issue in the 
terms that it did. If interjurisdictional immunity is to be considered, it 
would always be considered after pith and substance, and before 
paramountcy. This is so simply because a provincial law which does 
“impair” a federal undertaking from carrying on its undertaking, would 
be inapplicable even in the absence of conflicting federal legislation, and 
because paramountcy considerations are moot if interjurisdictional 
immunity does apply. The majority clearly recognized this when it stated 
“in theory, consideration of interjurisdictional immunity is apt for 
consideration after the pith and substance analysis”.56 
The issue is not really one of the order of application of the doctrines 
of interjurisdictional immunity and paramountcy. The question is 
whether interjurisdictional immunity should be applied at all, in 
particular cases. 
It would have been preferable if the majority had restricted itself to 
its statements that: 
[interjurisdictional immunity] will be largely reserved for those heads 
of power that deal with federal things, persons or undertakings, or 
where in the past its application has been considered absolutely 
indispensable or necessary to enable Parliament or a provincial 
legislature to achieve the purpose for which exclusive legislative 
jurisdiction was conferred, as discerned from the constitutional 
division of powers as a whole, or what is absolutely indispensable or 
necessary to enable an undertaking to carry out its mandate in what 
makes it specifically of federal (or provincial) jurisdiction.57 
The Court seems to be motivated by its desire to avoid a 
circumstance in which the “core” of every federal head of power would 
have to be identified, in order to determine whether or not provincial 
regulation has intruded into that core. Accordingly, the Court has 
restricted the doctrine to those federal heads of power governing things, 
persons or undertakings, and those heads of power which govern 
activities but in which the doctrine has already been applied.58 
Remember that the first reason the Court expressed for not favouring 
“an intensive reliance on the doctrine” was that broad application of the 
doctrine to “activities” created problems of application which do not 
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exist with respect to undertakings, things and persons. Application of the 
doctrine to the latter circumstance is conceptually easier, and the test is 
much more clearly articulated. It is consistent with the methodology of 
the analysis suggested in Bell Canada 198859 and Irwin Toy;60 provincial 
legislation strikes at the core of federal powers over undertakings, 
persons and things when it impairs the undertaking from carrying on its 
undertaking, or the person from engaging in activity which is 
specifically federal in nature (for example, in the case of “Indians”, the 
exercise of Aboriginal and treaty rights). 
The confusion in the analysis and application of interjurisdictional 
immunity has, in large part, flowed from the difficulty in applying the 
doctrine to federal heads of power governing “activities”. In those cases, 
there is not always a federal person, place or undertaking to which the 
test, whether it be the vital aspect test or an impairment test, can be 
applied. It is in these types of cases in which courts (like the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal in Lafarge)61 have asked the overly broad 
question of whether the provincial legislation affects a vital part of the 
federal power itself. 
The majority seems content to address this methodology of 
application problem by restricting the application of the doctrine to the 
undertakings cases, and the “activities” heads of power where the 
doctrine has already been recognized in the past. 
It would probably be unwise to consider this as an absolute bar 
against the extension of the doctrine to other federal heads of power 
which govern activities. However, it would likely require quite a 
dramatic case of provincial intrusion into a federal area of responsibility 
to justify further extension of the doctrine. 
4. Potential for Further Restrictions of the Doctrine 
In Canadian Western Bank, the majority reaffirmed that the doctrine 
of paramountcy “is much better suited to contemporary Canadian 
federalism” than is interjurisdictional immunity, referring to the “double 
aspect” case of Mangat.62 It is this preference for paramountcy which led 
the Court to restrict the application of the doctrine to federal things, 
                                                                                                             
59
 [1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.). 
60
 [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.). 
61
 Supra, note 41. 
62
 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 40, at para. 69; Mangat, supra, note 36. 
618 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
persons or undertakings, and those situations in which the doctrine has 
already been recognized in the jurisprudence. 
The majority goes no further than that in its reasons in Canadian 
Western Bank. However, in Lafarge, the Court appears to build on the 
reasons set out in Canadian Western Bank, stating as follows: 
For the reasons we gave in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 
SCC 22, released concurrently, we agree with the approach outlined by 
the late Chief Justice Dickson in OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney 
General), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 at p. 18, in which he characterized the 
arguments for an interjurisdictional immunity as not particularly 
compelling, and concluded that they ran contrary to the “dominant 
tide” of Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. In particular, in our 
view, the doctrine should not be used where, as here, the legislative 
subject matter (waterfront development) presents a double aspect. Both 
federal and provincial authorities have a compelling interest. Were 
there to be no valid federal land use planning controls applicable to 
the site, federalism does not require (nor, in the circumstances, should 
it tolerate) a regulatory vacuum, which would be the consequence of 
interjurisdictional immunity.63  
Later in the Lafarge decision, in discussing the scope of 
interjurisdictional immunity, the majority states: 
 The question before us, therefore, is whether it can be said that 
federal jurisdiction over all development on VPA lands within the port 
area of Vancouver, even non-Crown lands not used for shipping and 
navigation purposes, is “absolutely indispensable or necessary” to the 
discharge by the VPA of its responsibilities in relation to federal 
“public property” or “shipping and navigation”. We concluded in 
Canadian Western Bank that interjurisdictional immunity is not 
essential to make these federal powers effective for the purposes for 
which they were conferred and therefore this appeal should be decided 
on the basis of federal paramountcy, not interjurisdictional immunity.64  
Taken at face value, the statement that the doctrine should not be 
used where a case presents a double aspect, has potentially far-reaching 
restrictions on application of the doctrine. It raises the further question of 
when a case will be considered to be a “double aspect” case. 
In Mangat, the Court was considering the constitutional validity of 
provisions of the federal Immigration Act, which governed the 
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representation of aliens appearing before the Immigration Appeal Board. 
The Court acknowledged the statement of the Privy Council in Hodge v. 
The Queen65 where it was said that “subjects which in one aspect and for 
one purpose fall into s. 92, may in another aspect and for another 
purpose fall into s. 91”. The Court was of the view that the provisions 
had both federal and provincial features, the federal being the regulation 
of procedures before the Immigration Appeal Board, and the provincial 
being the regulation of the legal profession. Because the Court found 
each feature of roughly equivalent importance, the provisions were held 
to be validly enacted under the “double aspect” doctrine. 
Is it not the case, however, that virtually all cases in which 
interjurisdictional immunity is raised are “double aspect” cases? After 
all, interjurisdictional immunity questions the applicability of otherwise 
valid provincial legislation to something which is specifically federal. 
By definition, there is a valid provincial aspect; otherwise the provincial 
legislation would be ultra vires. Similarly, there is a federal feature by 
virtue of the special federal jurisdiction over federal undertakings and 
certain other persons or things. 
This potential must not be overstated, however. The leading double 
aspect cases are cases in which the federal “aspect” was one that fell 
within a federal head of power regulating “activities” as opposed to an 
undertaking, thing or person. In particular, the leading double aspect 
cases considered the federal aspect as one coming within criminal law.66 
This is to be contrasted with the treatment of the double aspect 
doctrine in the leading undertakings cases, being Bell Canada 196667 and 
Bell Canada 1988. The response of the Court in Bell Canada 1988 to the 
academic criticisms of Bell Canada 1966, particularly those of Professor 
Hogg, is instructive.68 Professor Hogg had criticized Bell Canada 1966 
as “coming down on the wrong side of the issue” because employment 
was a matter which clearly fell within provincial jurisdiction over 
property and civil rights in the province. Since the regulation of 
employment in federal industries still remained a matter related to 
employment generally, Professor Hogg argued that this was a perfect 
situation for the application of the double aspect doctrine.69 
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The Court in Bell Canada 1988 expressly rejected this position with 
respect to federal undertakings. It would take a further decision of the 
Court, expressly overturning this part of Bell Canada 1988, in order to 
reconsider application of the double aspect doctrine in the undertakings 
cases. The Court clearly did not go this far in the companion cases of 
Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In his dissenting reasons in Canadian Western Bank, Bastarache J. 
stated that the approach of the majority “severely restricts” the doctrine 
of interjurisdictional immunity.70 I agree completely with that 
assessment. 
Interjurisdictional immunity is now “largely reserved” for application 
to federal undertakings, persons and things, and those federal heads of 
power regulating “activities” which have already been recognized by 
precedent. Furthermore, the threshold for application of the doctrine has 
undoubtedly been raised, though how far the bar has risen does remain 
open to some question. 
To borrow from the analogy of Dickson C.J.C. in O.P.S.E.U.,71 the 
“dominant tide” of the doctrines of “double aspect” and “pith and 
substance” currently has the upper hand against the “undertow” of 
interjurisdictional immunity. In that sense, the pendulum truly has swung. 
However, as with all general statements, there are potential 
exceptions. In this case the potential exception is the application of the 
doctrine to the federal power over “Indians and Lands reserved for the 
Indians” under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In a 
decision released in December 2006, six months before the decisions in 
Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge, the Court considered whether 
valid provincial hunting legislation prohibiting hunting at night with the 
aid of a light could apply to Aboriginals exercising treaty rights to hunt.72 
In a 4-3 decision, the majority affirmed that treaty rights are at the “core” 
of the federal power over “Indians”, and held that only if the provincial 
law resulted in an “insignificant interference” with the treaty right could 
it apply to Aboriginals. Clearly, the threshold applied by the Court was 
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different than the new impairment standard set out in Canadian Western 
Bank just six months later.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the extent of the 
difference, or the rationale, if any, that exists for a different standard in 
the context of the federal power over “Indians”. For the purpose of this 
paper, suffice it to say that the issues surrounding the standard to be 
followed in the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity 
are not completely resolved. 
 
 
